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In this day of instant communication-faxes, video messages, worldwide
satellite transmissions-one of the ultimate ironies is that members of the judi-
ciary and Congress often fail to communicate about issues of mutual concern.
In convoluted transmissions evoking images of "E.T., phone home,"1 legislators
and judges struggle to find appropriate "hook-ups" and often in good faith frus-
tration simply cut the connection.
I am convinced that the separation of powers doctrine does not mean dead
lines or, at best, garbled static. The complexities of the law-making and law-
interpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic
dialogue between those who make and those who interpret legislation. History
suggests that dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches of govern-
ment was anticipated by the framers of the Constitution. Common sense sup-
ports the notion that the public good-and the economy-would be served by
enhanced communication between these branches. Even with enhanced dia-
logue, separation of powers would be preserved by each branch's exercise of its
primary power, structural constraints established by the Constitution, and the
independence of the individual players.
Two recent debates highlight the importance of dialogue between the two
branches. Both fall in the category of "we may not agree, but we might consider
discussing our positions before we decide!" The first example is a piece of pro-
posed legislation, which, if passed in its original form, would have had a signifi-
cant impact on case management and procedure throughout the federal court
system. Senate bill No. 2648,2 later tagged the "Biden bill," derived from a
study by the Brookings Institution" that apparently was produced with little
input from the federal judiciary. The introduction of the legislation provoked
concern among members of the judiciary and set up the two branches as adver-
saries on an issue where their ultimate goal was the same but views regarding
the means of accomplishing that goal diverged substantially. Regardless of the
merits of the various positions or of the legislation itself, early discussion be-
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tween the judiciary and the bill's proponents prior to its introduction would
have enhanced the understanding, avoided misunderstanding, and facilitated
more efficient development of the law. Public and private "bickering" would
have been minimized, and many hours would have been saved on both sides.
Although the enacted legislation might have been the same in the end, govern-
ment productivity and collegiality would have been served if all interested par-
ties had made an earlier effort to communicate about the issues.
Another example of how communication would help both branches accom-
plish their goals is the recent debate about the value of legislative history in
interpreting the law. Many judges are skeptical about the extent to which they
should rely on legislative committee reports, remarks made during floor debates,
and testimony at hearings interpreting a statute. In the context of discussing the
majority's use of a committee report to interpret congressional intent behind the
amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act, for example, now Associate
Justice Antonin Scalia has related Senator Robert Dole's concession during de-
bate on the Senate floor that neither he nor any other Senator had actually
written a particular report or read it in its entirety.4 Justice Scalia questions the
common assumption that committee reports represent the collective understand-
ing of members of Congress who shape the legislation, and he criticizes the
"level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has attained."'5
Other judges-including many who previously have served as members of Con-
gress-point to legislative history as an important indicator of congressional in-
tent.6 Some aspects of this debate cause legislators to wonder whether the judi-
ciary adequately understands the legislative process, just as judges during the
debates on the Biden bill wondered whether Congress understands the judicial
process. Systematic discussion between the two branches would inform the de-
bate on congressional intent, reduce misunderstandings, change some judges'
philosophical stances toward legislative history, and enhance the clarity of stat-
utory language.
The present dialogue between the judiciary and Congress tends to focus on
those clear areas that affect judges directly as federal employees. In the impor-
tant but difficult discussions on salary, benefits, and perquisites, judges must
approach Congress to discuss a no-win political issue. As a result, a perception
of self-interest naturally arises between the two branches. Neither side feels
appreciated or understood. Because the "pay and perks" negotiation-an obvi-
ous example of communication neither branch can do without-takes place on a
4. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 8 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a detailed analysis
of Justice Scalia's views, see generally, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation" How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160 (discussing Justice Scalia's textual approach to
interpreting statutes and his originalist approach to the Constitution).
S. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Costello, Average Voting
Members and Other "Benign Fictions" The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 60.
6. See, e.g., Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PiTT. L. REv. 627 (1987); see also The Role of
Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation A Discussion Between Judge Kenneth W. Starr and Judge Abner J.
Mikva, 1987 DUKE L.J. 361; Mikva, The Role of Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation: A Discussion




regular basis, the likely perception in Congress is that judges only come to Cap-
itol Hill to benefit themselves. Such a perception, though fairly accurate, does
not reflect the degree and type of interaction judges would be willing to engage
in if they could be reassured that their constitutional role, individual indepen-
dence, and ethical responsibilities would not be compromised.
Even assuming the reluctance of legislators and judges to interact is
grounded in an appropriate concern for separation of powers, our history is re-
plete with examples of constructive dialogue between the branches serving the
orderly development of our law. Separation was not intended to mean alienation
or to create antagonistic positions. The relationship between the judiciary and
Congress was not marked by professional distrust and begrudging compromise
when the Constitution originally established separate branches with distinct
powers. As the nation first developed under the political structure of the Ameri-
can Constitution, the branches worked together to define and develop the con-
tours of our legal system within constitutional boundaries. For example, the
Senate introduced as its first piece of legislation7 a bill that eventually became
the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789.8 This Act, which became law without great
controversy or fanfare, expanded the power of the judiciary by establishing a
system of inferior federal courts not called for in the Constitution and by grant-
ing jurisdiction to the Supreme Court far beyond what was constitutionally re-
quired. Congress conceded the position of the federal judiciary as final inter-
preters of the law' by not objecting to Marbury v. Madison.'0 These two
examples demonstrate a historical attitude remarkably different from the often
hesitant, and sometimes heated, interaction between the judges and legislators
of today.
This Article focuses on the relationship between the judiciary and Congress
for the purpose of understanding what communication is appropriate based on
the Constitution and other potential constraints. It first examines the Constitu-
tion and the relationship between Congress and the judiciary in the early years
of the republic as the American theory of separation of powers developed, more
or less, by trial and error."' The Article then discusses modern concerns that
contribute to our current perception of appropriate interaction between judges
and legislators."2 Among these modern concerns are the statutory requirements
relating to judicial conduct, the Judicial Code of Ethics, and other practical
matters such as judges' and legislators' lack of familiarity with the individuals
involved in, and the day-to-day operation of other branches of, government. Be-
sides this lack of familiarity-an unfortunate result of the growing complexity
of the legal system, the increased bureaucracy of administration in the federal
7. S. I, 1st Cong., Ist Sess. (1789); see also Kastenmeier & Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon
to the Federal Judiciary in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 58 (R. Katzmann ed.
1988).
8. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
9. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-2 (2d ed. 1988); R. ROTUNDA. J. NOWAK & J.N.
YOUNG. I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1.13-1.4 (1986).
10. 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
11. See infra Part 1.
12. See infra Part II.
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system, and the geographical separation that is not completely bridged by mod-
ern communication networks-these modern concerns establish few real limita-
tions on communication between members of the judiciary and Congress.
Finally, this Article proposes a test by which legislators and judges can
determine which specific interactions may legitimately cast doubt upon the in-
dependence of the judiciary.' 3 The Article seeks to encourage judges and legis-
lators, who tend to draw the line conservatively to avoid the appearance of im-
propriety, to communicate in all appropriate ways. Together-with the sense of
camaraderie that historically has characterized the relationship between Con-
gress and the judiciary-we then can address more effectively, or at least more
efficiently, the complex problems that face our legal system today.
I. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIARY
A. The Constitution
Several provisions of the Constitution, including the life tenure and com-
pensation requirements, the case or controversy limitation, and the separation of
powers doctrine, appear to limit interaction between Congress and the judiciary.
Much of the perceived impropriety of such interaction, however, is based simply
on the doctrine of separation of powers. The perceived limitation on interaction
between branches goes far beyond what the Constitution expressly requires.
The Constitution establishes the federal judiciary as a separate branch of
government with important structural protections empowering it to operate in-
dependent of influence from Congress. Federal judges are appointed for life by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 4 Article III provides
that "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of-
fice."'" These guarantees ensure judges can decide cases without fear of adverse
political or financial repercussions. Should a judge fail to maintain "good be-
havior" while serving on the bench, she may be removed only through the im-
peachment process authorized in article 11.16
The only direct implication of these protections on interaction between the
judiciary and Congress is that communication will take place, at a minimum,
during the confirmation and impeachment processes. Indirectly, the fact that
article III does not delineate further how the judiciary may protect its indepen-
dence from improper congressional influence suggests these structural protec-
tions alone are sufficient.
A second constitutional concern affecting interaction between the judiciary
and Congress is the case or controversy requirement of article III. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the phrase, "judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,"' 7
13. See infra Part II.
14. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
15. US. CON sT. art. III, § 1.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
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as barring all article III courts from determining abstract, hypothetical, or con-
tingent questions.18 This restriction means federal courts will not provide advi-
sory opinions on cases that are not properly before them. It does not mean
judges are restrained entirely from rendering advice about the law to Congress.
The Supreme Court has never held the case or controversy requirement prohib-
its judges from advising Congress about the need for, or the problems with, a
particular piece of legislation.
Although article III outlines to some extent the task of the judiciary and
the protections designed to facilitate that task, often the separation of powers
doctrine is mistakenly perceived as barring systematic communication between
the legislature and the judiciary. The separation of powers doctrine is usually
explained as one inferred from the tripartite structure of government, the enu-
meration of powers, and the system of checks and balances in the Constitu-
tion.19 Put simply, separation of powers prevents one branch from encroaching
on the functions unique to another or from assuming functions that might di-
minish a branch's assigned position within the tripartite system. Although the
doctrine may have implications on the interaction between Congress and the
judiciary, the doctrine does not necessarily preclude all communication between
the two branches.
One way to test whether constitutional separation of powers is a valid justi-
fication for limiting interaction between Congress and the judiciary is to con-
sider its effect on communications between other branches of government. For
example, no one would suggest that the President's communications with either
the House or Senate erode the independence of the President's decision to veto a
particular piece of legislation. Nor is regular interaction between legislators and
the staff of administrative agencies regarded as destroying the independent
judgment of either branch. Further, federal agencies often appear as parties or
intervenors in cases filed in federal court and, in that capacity, directly address
the judiciary. An officer or agent of the federal government may file an amicus
brief in federal court without obtaining either the consent or leave of the
court.20 The activities of joint commissions such as the Sentencing Commission,
composed of representatives from all three branches, clearly do not violate sepa-
ration of powers.21 Although separation of powers allows these intercommunica-
tions, many judges and legislators still believe the Constitution is the reason for
their inclination not to communicate with the other branch on a regular basis.
This perception, however, is not derived from the separation of powers doctrine
established in the Constitution.
B. The Federalist Papers: Separate but Connected Branches
An important value of the Federalist Papers, as of other historical docu-
ments from the colonial period, is the insight they offer into concerns about the
18. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
19. See. e.g., L. TRIBE. supra note 9, at § 2.2.
20. FED, R. App. P. 29.
21. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding as constitutional the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the product of the Sentencing Commission).
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American Constitution raised at the time of its adoption. Separation of powers
was one of those concerns, although the practical implications of separation of
powers in a tripartite system of government were virtually unknown at the time
the Constitution was adopted. The discussion about separation of powers is
found mainly in Federalist Nos. 47 and 48, written by James Madison, and
Federalist Nos. 78 and 81, written by Alexander Hamilton.
In Federalist No. 47, Madison explained that separation of powers gener-
ally means the legislative, judicial, and executive powers should not be united in
one person or body of government. Positing all three powers in one body, he
noted, violates the principles of a free society: "[W]here the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are sub-
verted." 22 Checks and balances such as the presidential veto, legislative im-
peachment, and judicial appointment were important to Madison in establishing
a "partial mixture of powers" because they allowed some control of one branch
over another.2 3 In Federalist No. 48, Madison pointed out that a certain degree
of separation is always necessary so that "powers properly belonging to one of
the departments [are] not . . . directly and completely administered by either
of the other departments. ' 24 For Madison, however, separation of powers did
not mean complete isolation between the three branches: Unless the depart-
ments are "connected and blended," the "degree of separation . . . essential to
a free government [] can never in practice be duly maintained." 25
Thus, Madison's writings demonstrate a conviction that separation of
power was not meant to be total separation or an unnatural isolation of mem-
bers of one branch from the others. Rather, separation of powers was estab-
lished by granting each of the three branches of government primary responsi-
bility for the tasks of enacting, interpreting, or enforcing the law. Additionally,
each branch is partially responsible for restraining the other branches through a
system of checks and balances expressly established in the Constitution. As long
as these structural protections are maintained, according to Madison, the proper
degree of separation will not be disturbed by interaction between the branches
that would connect and blend them. Moreover, Madison suggested that such
interaction is necessary to maintain the proper functioning of a free
government.
The writings of Hamilton also provide insight into some historical concerns
about the relation of the judiciary to the legislature. Hamilton predicted in Fed-
eralist No. 78 that the legislature naturally will tend to dominate over the judi-
ciary because it commands the purse and prescribes the rules that regulate the
"duties and rights of every citizen. ' 26 However, an independent judiciary pro-
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). For a com-
prehensive discussion of one source of inspiration for our tripartite system of government, see Bergman, Montes-
quieu's Theory of Government and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 201
(1991).
23. Id. at 339-40.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
25. Id.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
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tected by life tenure is the best way "to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws" according to Hamilton.27 He described the courts as
an "intermediate body between the people and the legislature" to interpret the
laws and help confine the legislature to its own scope of authority.28 Hamilton
reiterated this idea of judicial intermediation in Federalist No. 81 by explaining
that popular fears of judicial encroachment on the authority of the legislature
are "in reality a phantom" because the judiciary lacks power to enforce the
law-power with which it also might "usurp" the authority of the other
branches.2 9 According to Hamilton, any fears of an imbalance arising from the
judiciary's actions are unsubstantiated because of the "complete security" the
threat of impeachment provides.30
The writings of both Hamilton and Madison about the judiciary and sepa-
ration of powers in the Federalist Papers give no indication that the framers
were concerned about possible harm that might result from regular public and
personal interaction between Congress and the federal judiciary. The Federalist
Papers demonstrate confidence in the structural protection of the Constitution
provided by three separate branches with distinct functions plus the additional
security of specific checks and balances. In order for a tripartite system to func-
tion smoothly, however, Madison emphasized the branches must blend and con-
nect. Hamilton focused on the importance of upright and impartial administra-
tion of the law in federal courts-a goal he believed would be achieved by
appointing judges for life. The writings of neither man demonstrate any notable
concern that communication between judges and legislators, in either their offi-
cial or personal capacities, would destroy the vitality of separation of powers or
the impartiality of federal judges.
C. Historical Connections Between the Two Branches
The historical record of our nation is replete with examples of overlapping
responsibilities and close interaction between Congress and the judiciary. Al-
though the possibility of simultaneous responsibility in both branches has been
largely foreclosed in the modern era-to the great relief of overworked legisla-
tors and judges-the regular, uninhibited interaction between members of both
branches as they went about their official duties and their personal lives remains
an example for us today.
Many men first appointed as federal judges participated in the debates of
the Constitutional Convention and the creation of the new republic. Among the
twelve justices who sat on the Supreme Court during its first decade of opera-
tion, six had served in the Continental Congress, four served in the Confedera-
tion Congress, and two served in the federal Congress. 3' The five who did not
27. Id.
28. Id. at 492.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
30. Id. at 509.
31. Marcus & Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 32 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988). See generally, I THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 (Part 1) (M. Marcus & J. Perry eds. 1985)
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serve in any national Congress participated in the state ratification conven-
tions. 2 This experience gave them insight into the legislative process as a whole
and the frustrations members of Congress would feel as they began to enact
legislation consistent with the constitutional framework the states had adopted.
Many federal judges gave formal advice to Congress on an individual basis
about a variety of issues that eventually were reviewed in federal court. For
example, when Congress sought to amend the Judiciary Act in the 1790s, Su-
preme Court Justices worked with a congressional committee as it drafted the
bill.33 Associate Justices William Paterson 4 and Bushrod Washington35 even
offered their own version of the bill to Congress based on what they thought was
necessary to reform the federal judicial system.36 After Congress finally settled
on a draft version, several Justices were asked specifically for their comments.3 7
Federal judges performed various extrajudicial governmental functions in
the new republic during their tenure on the bench.38 For example, Congress
appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as a commissioner of the
Sinking Fund during an early attempt to reduce public debt.39 The Chief Jus-
tice also was appointed inspector of the United States Mint.4 Further, Congress
required federal district judges to conduct jail proceedings under the Debtors'
Relief Act of 1796.41 When congressional elections were contested, district
judges were required to question witnesses about the actions of local officials in
conducting the election and then report to Congress. 42 District judges also inves-
tigated petitions concerning unintentional violations of the customs laws and
sent the results to the federal Treasury Secretary for determination of an appro-
priate fine.43 Finally, district judges were responsible for the frequent task of
evaluating the moral character of aliens who requested citizenship through the
process of naturalization. 44
In addition to the formal functions they performed, federal judges often
lobbied for specific legislative changes by approaching members of Congress on
an informal basis. A brief review of the communication by mail between federal
judges and federal and state legislators demonstrates the wide range of political
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,1)] (providing biographical sketches of each Supreme Court Justice from
the first appointment, John Jay, in September 1789 to John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice in 1801).
32. Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 31, at 32.
33. Id.
34. William Paterson (1745-1806) served as a delegate from New Jersey to the Constitutional Convention,
United States Senator from 1789 to 1790, Governor of New Jersey from 1790 to 1793, and Associate Justice on
the Supreme Court from 1793 to 1806. For additional biographical information, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,I). supra note 31, at 82-93.
35. Bushrod Washington (1762-1829) served as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates from 1787 to
1788 and Associate Justice on the Supreme Court from 1798 to 1829. For additional biographical information, see
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,1), supra note 31, at 124-36.
36. Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 31, at 43.
37. Id.
38. See generally, Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 123.
39. Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186.
40. Act of Apr. 2, 1792, ch. 16, § 18, 1 Stat. 250.
41. Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 38, 1 Stat. 482.
42. Act of Jan. 23, 1798, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 537.
43. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 122-23.
44. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414-15.
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and social concerns that members of both branches shared. For example, Asso-
ciate Justice William Cushing45 wrote Massachusetts Congressman Theodore
Sedgwick 8 about the importance of promoting a bill for the compensation of
federal grand jury members.47 Congressman Henry Glen48 notified John Jay49
of the Senate's confirmation of Jay's appointment as Chief Justice as soon as
the vote was completed. 50 Theodore Sedgwick wrote Chief Justice John Jay
about a government job for one of his friends from Boston.5 ' Chief Justice Jay
wrote Congressman Fisher Ames52 thanking him for recommendations for can-
didates for federal appointments.53 Congressman William Loughton Smith54
wrote to Senior Associate Justice Edward Rutledge55 about Congress's views on
the proper attire of the Court, the design of the Seals, and circuit assignments.58
Congressman Jonathan Dayton 57 wrote Justice Paterson about various subjects
including news of the nomination of John Marshall-rather than Paterson-as
Chief Justice, compromises arising from the politics of the nomination, and his
45. William Cushing (1732-1810) served as Associate Justice on the Supreme Court from 1789 to 1810. For
additional biographical information, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,I), supra note 31, at 24-30.
46. Theodore Sedgwick (1746-1813) served as a member of the House of Representatives from 1789 to 1796
and from 1799 to 1801, United States Senator from 1796-99, and as a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts from 1802 to 1813. See I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES. 1789-1800 (Part II) 665 n.* (M. Marcus & J. Perry eds. 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11)].
47. Letter from William Cushing to Theodore Sedgwick (Feb. 21, 1791), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, 139-40 (M. Marcus ed. 1988) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (11)].
48. Henry Glen (1739-1814) served as clerk of Schenectady County, New York from 1767-1809 and then as
congressman from New York from 1793-1801. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 905 n.
49. John Jay (1745-1830) served as the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1789 to 1795, when he
resigned to become Governor of New York. For further biographical information, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,1), supra note 31, at 3-14.
50. Letter from Henry Glen to John Jay (Dec. 20, 1800), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1.11), supra
note 46, at 905.
51. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to John Jay (Sept. 23, 1789), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 665.
52. Fisher Ames (1758-1808) represented Massachusetts in the House of Representatives. See DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY (1,1), supra note 31, at 178 n.27.
53. Letter from John Jay to Fisher Ames (Nov. 27, 1789), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1.11), supra
note 46, at 680.
54. William Loughton Smith (1758-1812) served in the South Carolina House of Representatives from 1794
to 1798 and in the First Congress from 1789 to 1797. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (I. I1), supra note 46, at 695-
96 n.
55. John Rutledge (1739-1800) served as a representative of South Carolina at the First and Second Conti-
nental Congresses, the first president of the South Carolina Republic from 1776 to 1778, Governor of South
Carolina from 1779 to 1782, member of the House of Representatives from 1782 to 1784, and a representative of
South Carolina at the Constitutional Convention. In 1789, President Washington appointed Rutledge as Senior
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Rutledge resigned from this position in March 1791 to become Chief
Justice of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. In June 1795, assuming John Jay would resign as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to accept his election as Governor of New York, Rutledge wrote President Washing-
ton to offer his services. Washington gratefully accepted. The Senate, however, rejected this nomination because of
Rutledge's vocal opposition to the Jay Treaty. For more biographical information, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,1), supra note 31, at 15-23.
56. Letter from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 13, 1790), reprinted in pOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 695.
57. Jonathan Dayton represented New Jersey in the House of Representatives from 1791 to 1799 and was a
member of the Senate from 1799 to 1805. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 918 n.
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general disgust with President Adams' administration. 8 Justice Paterson then
wrote Dayton back about Marshall's genius and what Patterson considered the
proper perspective on recent political developments.5
Associate Justice James Iredell 60 maintained communication with many
members of Congress. He and his brother-in-law, Senator Samuel Johnston,61
corresponded on a regular basis about various topics including dinner parties
with the President,62 likely candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court,63
Iredell's impending nomination as an Associate Justice,64 what colleagues in the
Senate had said about Iredell in the confirmation hearings,65 Iredell's despair
upon hearing he was assigned first to ride the Southern Circuit,66 the Senate's
rejection of Associate Justice Rutledge's nomination to Chief Justice after his
public attack on the Jay Treaty at Saint Michael's Church in Charleston, 67 and
even poor Justice Wilson's unfortunate business and personal affairs.68 Senator
Pierce Butler69 wrote Justice Iredell to congratulate him on his recent appoint-
ment to the Court and to recommend accommodations in New York City.70
North Carolina state legislator Archibald Maclaine wrote Justice Iredell about
58. Letter from Jonathan Dayton to William Paterson (Jan. 20, 1801), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 918; Letter from Jonathan Dayton to William Paterson (Jan. 28, 1801), reprinted in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 923.
59. Letter from William Paterson to Jonathan Dayton (Jan. 25, 1801), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 920-21 (Paterson advised Dayton not to take recent developments too seriously, stating:
"Give me the easy chair of the jolly, laughing philosopher, Democritus, and anybody for me shall be welcome to
the gloomy tub of weeping Heraclitus.").
60. James Iredell (1751-1799) served as a North Carolina Superior Court Judge and delegate to the North
Carolina ratification convention before being appointed as Associate Justice the United States Supreme Court in
1790. For further biographical information about Justice Iredell, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,I), supra note
31, at 60-68.
61. Samuel Johnston (1733-1816) was a Senator from North Carolina. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (I,[). supra
note 31, at 540 n.7.
62. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Feb. 4, 1790), reprinted In DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 688-89.
63. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Dec. 1, 1789), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 681; see also Letter from Samuel Johnston to James lredell (Feb. 27, 1796), reprinted in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 840 (discussing Justice Cushing's refusal to be Chief Justice,
qualifications of Associate Justice Samuel Chase).
64. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Feb. 7, 1790), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY ([,I),
supra note 31, at 64.
65. Letter from Samuel Johnson to James Iredell (Feb. It, 1790), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 694.
66. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Mar. 18, 1790), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 703.
67. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Jan. 9, 1796), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 825. For further information about Justice Rutledge's views on the Jay Treaty, see
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,I), supra note 31, at 17.
68. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (July 28, 1798), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11), supra note 46, at 859. For further details about Justice Wilson's life, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,I),
supra note 31, at 44-53; Letter from John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams (June 23, 1793), reprinted
in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (I1), supra note 47, at 408-10; Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (Aug. 11,
1797), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 856-57.
69. Pierce Butler (1744-1822) served in the South Carolina legislature from 1778 to 1782 and 1784 to 1789.
represented South Carolina in the Constitutional Convention, and served as a United States Senator from 1789 to
1796. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11), supra note 46, at 662 n.2.
70. Letter from Pierce Butler to James Iredell (Feb. 10, 1790), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11).
supra note 46, at 692-93.
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the impending announcement of Iredell's appointment 7' and the best route to
take when riding the Southern Circuit. 2
The failure of the riding circuit, as originally designed by Congress, pro-
voked a heated exchange of correspondence. District Judge David Sewel
73
wrote Congressman George Thatcher14 about the dire need for congressional
reform of the circuit system.75 Court clerk Simeon Baldwin76 wrote in complaint
to Congressman Uriah Tracy7 7 about his general dissatisfaction with the circuit
system and the serious delay caused by the failure of a Supreme Court Justice
to show up on a regular basis for circuit court.78 Senator Rufus King79 and
Chief Justice Jay corresponded about the problem of inconsistent judgments
resulting from the difficulties involved in reporting the decisions made while
riding circuit.8 0
These examples and many others illustrate the extent to which members of
the judiciary and state and federal legislatures interacted during the early years
of the republic. Although ideas about the propriety of regular communication
and most extrajudicial appointments have changed substantially during the last
two centuries, 81 these historical examples clearly refute the common perception
that the relationship between legislators and judges always has been strained.
These examples also demonstrate that judges have not always isolated
themselves from other branches of government to preserve their impartiality.
The present lack of communication about many areas of common concern is not
supported by the framers' view about separation of powers or the appropriate
relation between Congress and the judiciary, although it may be related to a
natural tendency on the part of judges and members of Congress to avoid all
interaction so as to avoid the appearance of impropriety. This modern preoccu-
pation with possible impropriety-to the extent it limits mutual cooperation and
useful interaction-must be remedied to prevent intergovernmental antago-
nisms. In light of these examples of everyday interaction that enabled the legis-
71. Letter from Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell (Mar. 10, 1790), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1,11). supra note 46, at 702.
72. Letter from Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell (Mar. 10, 1790), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(11), supra note 47, at 14.
73. David Sewell (1735-1825) served as district judge of Maine from 1789 to 1818. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(11), supra note 47. at 70 n.
74. George Thatcher (1754-1824) served as district judge of Maine from 1789 to 1818. DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY (11). supra note 47, at 70 n.
75. Letter from David Sewell to George Thatcher (Nov. 25, 1792), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(11), supra note 47, at 334.
76. Simeon Baldwin (1761-1851) served as clerk of the United States district and circuit courts for the
district of Connecticut. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (11), supra note 47, at 453 n.
77. Uriah Tracy (1755-1807) represented Connecticut in the House of Representatives from 1793 to 1796.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (11). supra note 47, at 453 n.
78. Letter from Simeon Baldwin to Uriah Tracy (May 5, 1794), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (!I),
supra note 47. at 452-53.
79. Rufus King (1755-1827) served as a delegate from Massachusetts to the Confederation Congress and the
Constitutional Convention and a Senator from New York from 1789 to 1796. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1,11),
supra note 46. at 642 n.
80. Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 19, 1793), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (II), supra
note 47, at 434; Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 22, 1793). reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (11),
supra note 47. at 434-35.
81. See infra Part ll.B.
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lators and judges who devised our purely American form of separation of pow-
ers to "connect and blend," we now examine the modern concerns that define
appropriate interaction between Congress and the judiciary.
II. MODERN CONCERNS DEFINING APPROPRIATE INTERACTION
A. Statutes
Like the Constitution, statutes offer limited guidance on the appropriate
relationship between the judiciary and Congress. Among the statutes directly
regulating judicial activity are the laws requiring financial disclosure, laws regu-
lating conflicts of interest, and laws establishing the Judicial Conference and
the Administrative Office.
Like other federal personnel, judges are required to report to the executive
branch their income and investments within a certain period of time of their
federal appointment. This information is made available to the congressional
committee considering their nomination.82 Although the law requires judges to
communicate important financial information to Congress, it does not define the
scope of communication between the legislature and the judiciary on other top-
ics of mutual interest.8 3
Judges are, of course, affected by various laws implicating staffing, use of
appropriated funds, supplies, chambers, and similar components of the federal
budget. Recently, Congress placed a workload certification requirement on fed-
eral judges who have elected senior status. 84 Again, these statutes do not limit
in any notable way the extent to which judges and legislators may interact on
matters of mutual concern.
A federal judge is prohibited by statute from considering a case where she
may have a conflict of interest.8 The statute is intended to foster impartiality
by regulating even the appearance of impropriety.86 However, it does not pre-
vent judges from communicating with legislators about issues of mutual con-
cern. In Laird v. Tatum,8 7 now Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the con-
flicts of interest statute does not require a judge to recuse herself if before her
nomination she expressed her understanding of the meaning of a particular pro-
vision of the Constitution at issue in a case. 8 Based on the Chief Justice's posi-
tion in Laird, public comment on proposed legislation does not rise to a conflict
of interest when the proper interpretation of that statute later is presented to
the court as a legal issue.
82. 5 U.S.C § 103(c), (d) (1988).
83. 5 U.S.C §§ 101-109 (1988).
84. 28 U.S.C § 371(b)(1), (f) (1988).
85. 28 U.S.C § 455 (1988).
86. See Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
814 (1983).
87. 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
88. Id. at 839.
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Congress also has established by statute the Judicial Conference89 and the
Administrative Office 0 of the United States to administer the federal court sys-
tem. The Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office have increased sig-
nificantly the level and means of communication between members of the judi-
ciary and Congress through official channels. For example, last year in an
official press conference at the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist ad-
dressed the impact of inadequate pay for judicial officers on the federal judici-
ary.91 This press conference was the first ever held by a Chief Justice.92 In con-
nection with the Administrative Office, judicial officers and representatives
made at least sixty-nine appearances for public testimony before the 100th Con-
gress and seventy-eight appearances before the 101st Congress.93 Further, a
Federal Courts Study Committee was created by statute in 1988 to examine
and report on issues facing the judiciary, including methods of alternative dis-
pute resolution, the structure and administration of the federal court system,
means of resolving intra-circuit and inter-circuit splits on legal issues and meth-
ods of advising Congress and others on the law." The Study Committee
brought together members of the judiciary and Congress to discuss these areas
of common concern; among its fifteen participants were six judges and four
legislators.9 5
An important initiative in the effort to facilitate communication between
the judiciary and legislature was the establishment in 1986 of the Governance
Institute. The Governance Institute is a small not-for-profit organization con-
cerned with exploring, explaining, and easing problems associated with the sep-
aration of powers in a democratic polity. Under the leadership of Judge Frank
M. Coffin,96 for example, the Committee on the Judicial Branch of the Judicial
Conference of the United States has pursued through the Governance Institute
an examination of past, present, and future relations between Congress and the
judiciary. In a workshop sponsored by the Institute in 1989, judges, legislators,
and academics met to examine and discuss many facets of judicial and legisla-
tive interaction. The Committee on the Judicial Branch and the Institute con-
tinue to focus on these important issues.9 7
89. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1990).
90. Id. § 601.
91. L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, at A2, col. 3.
92. Telephone interview with David A. Sellers, Public Information Officer, Office of Legislative and Public
Affairs, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Nov. 29, 1990).
93. Id.
94. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-109, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988).
95. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMI'TEE 101ST CONG_ 1st SEss. (Part II) (Committee Print
1990). The members of the Federal Courts Study Committee were Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman; J.
Vincent Aprile 11; Chief Justice Keith M. Callow; Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.; Morris Harrell; Rep. Robert W.
Kastenmeier; Rex E. Lee; Diana Gribbon Motz; Judge Jose A. Cabranes; Judge Levin H. Campbell; Sen. Charles
E. Grassley; Sen. Howell Helffin; Judge Judith N. Keep; Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead; and Judge Richard A. Posner.
Id.
96. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
97. I thank my friend and r'espected colleague Judge Frank Coffin for his valuable assistance in reviewing
this paper and providing historical perspective on the work of the Committee on the Judicial Branch. which he
chaired from 1983 to 1990. I also thank Robert Katzmann, President of the Governance Institute, for material he
provided about the Institute.
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The interaction that takes place on a regular basis through the various ac-
tivities of these official bodies does not imply that judges in general may not
communicate with Congress as Conference members, as committee heads, or
simply in their individual capacities about Conference decisions or anything be-
sides Conference business. Of course, it is important that judges be aware of the
official Conference position and distinguish clearly between their personal views
and Conference policy when communicating with members of Congress. The
effectiveness of the Judicial Conference's legislative initiatives depends on the
judiciary speaking clearly with one voice when articulating official Conference
positions.
B. The Code of Judicial Conduct
The revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Model Code), adopted by
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in August 1990,98 af-
fects to a much greater degree the interaction between judges and Congress
than does either the Constitution or federal law. As stated in the preamble, the
purpose of the Model Code is to establish standards for the ethical conduct of
judges to ensure an "independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret
and apply the laws that govern us."'99 In adopting the revision, the American
Bar Association was concerned that judges "respect and honor the judicial office
as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal
system."100 The most important parts of the Model Code relating to communi-
cations with the legislature are those concerning ex parte and public communi-
cations (Canon 3), extrajudicial activities (Canon 4), and inappropriate political
activities (Canon 5).
Canon 3 of the Model Code generally prohibits ex parte and public com-
munications during a pending or impending proceeding. Ex parte communica-
tions are communications that involve fewer than all the parties legally entitled
to participate in a discussion of any matter.' According to Canon 3.B(7), "[a]
judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or con-
sider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the par-
ties concerning a pending or impending proceeding."'0 2 The provision lists five
broad exceptions to this prohibition: (1) communications related to scheduling,
administration, or procedural emergencies under some limited circumstances;
(2) communications to solicit advice from a "disinterested expert on the law";
(3) consultations with other judges or court personnel; (4) conferences with the
parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle; and (5) other ex parte
communications expressly authorized by law. 03
The commentary to this provision explains the proscription against ex parte
communications about a proceeding applies to communications with all persons
98. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. J. SHAMAN. S. LUBET & J. ALFINI. JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 149 (1990).




who are participants in the proceeding. 104 The commentary notes that when a
judge communicates with an expert as permitted in limited circumstances, the
preferred procedure is to invite the expert to file an amicus brief.'0 5 Further, the
judge must give the parties notice of the identity of any expert with whom she
has communicated and the substance of the communication and provide them
with an opportunity to respond. 06 In every case, a judge must disclose to the
parties all ex parte communications she has received. 10 7
The Model Code also strictly limits public comments a judge may make
during a pending or impending proceeding. Canon 3.B(9) states: "A judge shall
not. . . make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect
[a proceding's] outcome or impair its fairness."10 8 The commentary points out
that this prohibition continues during the entire appellate process until the final
disposition of a matter. 09 However, the canon "does not prohibit judges from
making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining
for public information the procedures of the court.""' In addition to restricting
public comment, the Canon prohibits judges from "mak[ing] any nonpublic
comment that might interfere substantially with a fair trial or hearing.""'
However, the Model Code includes no specific time frame related to the litiga-
tion process in restricting nonpublic or private comments as it does for public
comments. As a result, this limitation on nonpublic comment potentially could
impact almost any private or personal communication between members of the
judiciary and Congress whether or not the litigation of that matter has ended.
Canon 4 of the Model Code attempts to outline the extent to which a judge
may participate in extrajudicial activities. This restriction affects a determina-
tion of which interactions between judges and legislators are appropriate be-
cause it governs what testimony judges may offer at public hearings. According
to Canon 4.A., no extrajudicial activity may: "(1) cast reasonable doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge; (2) demean the judicial office; or
(3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.""' More specifi-
cally, the commentary to this provision states a judge may speak, write, lecture,
teach, and participate in other activities relating to the law, legal system, ad-
ministration of justice, and other nonlegal subjects as long as these activities do
not violate other provisions of the Model Code."' However, the Canon does not
expressly allow a judge to appear at a public hearing or consult with a legisla-
tive body or official on any subject other than the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice."' As with the prohibition against nonpublic communi-
cations, this limitation on the subjects a judge may address in public testimony




108. Id. Canon 3.B(9).
109. Id. Canon 3.B(9) comment.
110. Id. Canon 3.B(9).
II. LId.
112. Id. Canon 4.A.
113. Id. Canon 4.A comment.
114. Id.
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potentially could affect a wide range of communications between the judiciary
and Congress. Unless a judge testifies on a subject clearly pertaining to the law,
the legal system, or the administration of justice, the Model Code suggests that
the communication is improper on ethical grounds.
Despite the broad scope of these prohibitions, the commentary to Canon 4
recognizes the contribution a judge can make toward legislative reform. "As a
judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique
position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice . . . ."-15 This insight about the value of a judge's
professional experience to assist in the development of the law on a nuts-and-
bolts level is particularly true with respect to the interpretation and application
of statutes drafted by Congress, much-needed reforms in criminal law and sen-
tencing, and virtually all aspects of civil and criminal procedure. Most judges
have developed valuable views on the practical aspects of these and other mat-
ters because their work on the bench requires them to test and adapt the law so
it works in day-to-day practice. Judges know when a statute is ambiguous, un-
wieldy, impractical, or shortsighted as a result of problems encountered in
drafting, the legislators' lack of experience with the justice system, or the reality
of political compromise. Judges wrestle with interpreting the law on a daily
basis, and their expertise should be regarded as an available and worthy re-
source that legislators regularly consider.
Canons 4 and 5 further define how judges may use their expertise about
the legal system appropriately as they interact with other branches of govern-
ment. Canon 4 states that judges may not accept appointments to government
commissions or committees that deal with issues other than improvement of the
law. The Model Code explains that the propriety of such activities must be
evaluated in light of demands placed on a judge's time and resources by
crowded dockets and the need to protect the judiciary from public controversy.
Clearly, the major concern behind this restriction is the possibility of public
controversy interfering with the "effectiveness and independence of the judici-
ary." Similarly, Canon 5 forbids judges entirely from holding office in any polit-
ical organization, endorsing a candidate publicly for political office, making
speeches for a political candidate, attending political gatherings, or soliciting
funds for political campaigns.
Although the Model Code offers more guidance than the Constitution or
federal statutes about appropriate conduct of judges, it fails to define exactly
when permissible extrajudicial communications impair a judge's impartiality.
The Model Code primarily tells judges what they and others already
know-that is, when any activity impairs a judge's impartiality, she must ab-
stain. Moreover, the Code even may have a seriously adverse effect on otherwise
appropriate interaction by not providing specific guidelines for judges. Any con-
crete determination about appropriate interaction is left to a judge or the disci-
plinary process. Without specific guidelines, judges will continue to err on the
115. Id. Canon 4.B comment.
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conservative side by isolating themselves from public and private debate on cur-
rent issues that are not impending or pending in a case before the courts.
As noted before, any mutual antagonism and lack of cooperation between
the two branches have resulted in part from failure to communicate in appropri-
ate ways about common concerns. What we all need, and what the Constitution,
the laws, and the Model Code do not provide, is a pragmatic approach to deter-
mine which specific extrajudicial interactions will not impair a judge's capacity
to make independent determinations on issues facing the bench.
III. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE INTERACTION BETWEEN JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS
Enhanced communication between judges and legislators would be a con-
structive development for government, and impediments to that development re-
sult from benign wariness rather than intentional disregard. Perhaps judges
would be less wary if specific interactions could be measured against guiding
principles that take into account the relevant constraints but still encourage
communication." The presumption should favor open interchange between the
two branches unless a specific constraint forbids it. Although formulating such a
test is tantamount to the proverbial "nailing Jello to the wall," the following
guidelines might assist judges as they consider fostering a relationship of com-
munication with the legislative branch:
A. Does the communication concern the law, the legal system, or the adminis-
tration of justice?
(1) If so, then the communication is presumed appropriate whether it takes
place in a public hearing or private context. The scope of matters concern-
ing the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice shall be inter-
preted broadly.
(2) If the communication does not concern the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice, it is presumed appropriate simply as de minimus
personal communication not raising reasonable questions about a judge's
impartiality.
B. The presumption of propriety may be overcome by showing the communi-
cation in question clearly violates a specific prohibition such as:
(1) Canon 3.B(7) of the Model Code prohibiting ex parte communications
involving fewer than all the parties, witnesses, or attorneys in a pending or
impending case that do not qualify for one of the limited exceptions stated
in the Judicial Code;
(2) Canon 3.B(9) prohibiting: (a) public comment specifically related to a
pending or impending judicial proceeding that might reasonably be ex-
pected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness and (b) nonpublic com-
116. This article has focused primarily on the relationship between the United States Congress and the fed-
eral judiciary. The proposed guidelines, however, also should serve as a guide to interaction between state legisla-
tures and state courts.
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ment that might substantially interfere with the fairness of that proceeding
(Reasonability and substantiality under this subsection shall be evaluated
using an objective standard.);
(3) Canon 3.B(1 1) prohibiting disclosure for any purpose unrelated to judi-
cial duties and nonpublic information acquired in a judge's judicial capac-
ity; or
(4) Canon 5.A.(1)(b)-(c), (e) prohibiting public endorsement of or opposi-
tion to a candidate for public office, speeches on behalf of a political organi-
zation or candidate.
The purpose of these proposed guidelines is to assist those involved in mea-
suring the propriety of communications between judges and legislators. Natu-
rally, not all communications will fit neatly into the proposed parameters but
these guidelines may provide a starting point that could be helpful in developing
more precise criteria that govern specific kinds of communication."' 7 As stated
in subsection A(1), communications between judges and legislators are pre-
sumed appropriate if they relate to the law, the legal system, or the administra-
tion of justice. This presumption of propriety is intended to encourage commu-
nication and interaction between members of the judicial and legislative
branches in order to promote efficient and effective development of the law.
This presumption of propriety replaces any explicit restrictions in the origi-
nal Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1972) that were not incorporated in the
revised Model Code. One deliberate omission from the revised Model Code re-
lating to the possible impropriety of communication between judges and legisla-
tors was part of Canon 4 of the original Model Code. In that provision, a judge
was permitted to consult with executive or legislative bodies outside of a public
hearing only about the administration of justice. Possible implications of this
provision include the prohibition of all private communications about the law,
the legal system, or anything else not specifically pertaining to the administra-
tion of justice. Because the revised Model Code no longer expressly limits
judges from communicating with legislative bodies or officials outside of a pub-
lic hearing, such a limitation should not be implied in the revised Model Code.
Limitations not incorporated in the revised Model Code should not continue to
restrict otherwise appropriate interaction on a wide range of legal or personal
matters. These proposed guidelines are intended to minimize any implicit as-
sumptions or attitudes about the impropriety of communication between the ju-
diciary and legislators not expressly prohibited in the revised Model Code.
Additionally, under subsection A(2) communications outside the broad cat-
egory of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice also are
presumed appropriate as de minimus "personal communication."" 8 Personal
117. See, e.g., F. COFFIN, The Federalist No. 86: On Relations Between the Judiciary and Congress in
JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 26-28 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988) (suggesting examples
of communication that need specific criteria, such as a judge speaking against an official position of the Judicial
Conference, a judge giving an assessment of judicial candidates to a member of Congress, a legislator's communi-
cation with a judge about a litigated case).
118. For my general recommendation about a de minimus rule, see letter from Judge Deanell Tacha to
Subcommittee on Code of Judicial Conduct, Appellate Judges Conference of The American Bar Association
(Sept. 14, 1989). In this letter I explained: "[flt is essential to preserve for the judge and for the system itself the
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communications rarely should be questioned on ethical grounds merely because
they involve the interaction of legislators and judges. Frequent interaction is
expected and encouraged among members of the judiciary and Congress who
have legitimate professional and personal ties. It would be artificial to regulate
these communications unless they are shown to contravene a specific prohibition
of the Model Code. Personal discourse between judges and legislators should be
viewed as appropriate interaction between colleagues with mutual interests en-
gaged in a common task.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to point out the lack of historical, legal, or ethi-
cal impediments to enhanced communication between members of the judiciary
and Congress. It also proposed guidelines that could enable us to overcome our
natural inclination to limit communication for fear of apparent impropriety.
The issues and problems that both the judicial and legislative branches confront
are complex. They elude unilateral solution. However, our nation cannot afford
the "static" produced when Congress and the judiciary fail to communicate ef-
fectively and debate vigorously on issues of mutual concern. It must be possible
for the expertise and experience of judges and legislators to "blend" to achieve
a better hookup without compromising the essential principles of judicial ethics
and separation of powers. We must encourage the development of appropriate
discourse. As communication and technology advance, perhaps E.T. can phone
home.
ability to engage in benign social interaction, polite amenities, and community service, and to encourage a modi-
cum of human empathy. Thus, some statement of [a] de minimus threshold would be an important addition to the
Preamble." Id.
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